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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce stands out among its peers of national 
advocacy organizations for its efforts to influence the U.S. Supreme 
Court.1  The Chamber wields its influence by filing amicus curiae, or 
“friend of the court,” briefs as a secondary source to aid the Court in its 
decision-making.2 Amicus briefs serve as valuable sources of knowledge 
and provide the Justices with unique insights from various interest groups. 
However, the role of the amicus brief continues to evolve as the increasing 
number of amicus briefs filed with the Court make it impractical for the 
Justices to thoroughly read all such briefs that are filed. Consequently, 
those interest groups that have access to the legal and financial resources 
to petition the Court, both frequently and effectively, increase their 
 
 *I express deepfelt appreciation for the guidance and research on this topic from Professor Michael 
E. Solimine, Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. 
 1. John Shiffman, Chamber of Commerce Forms its Own Elite Law Team, Rueters: #Special 
Reports (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-scotus-firms-chamber/chamber-of-commerce-
forms-its-own-elite-law-team-idUSKBN0JM10Q20141208. 
 2. Adam Feldman, The Most Effective Friends of the Court, Empirical SCOTUS (May 11, 2016), 
https://empiricalscotus.com/2016/05/11/the-most-effective-friends-of-the-court/. 
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likelihood of influencing the Justices’ decisions. 3 Most notably, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce (“Chamber”) increased its participation in the 
judicial process by filing amicus briefs at the U.S. Supreme Court 
(“Court”) level with the assistance of sophisticated outside counsel, and 
the Chamber’s efforts have produced positive results, with the Court 
ruling in favor of corporate interests.4  
Over the past 227 years, the Court has changed very little, but the role 
played by amicus curiae briefs in the Court’s decision-making process 
continues to drastically evolve.5 The term “amicus curiae,” formerly 
portrayed a professional relationship to the Court, in which the lawyer 
was a “friend,” of sorts, assisting the Court in understanding the issue 
before it, rather than acting with the influence and standing of a lawyer 
representing a party.6 It was not until the twentieth century that it became 
common for organizational sponsors to fulfill the role of amicus.7 Amicus 
briefs provide Justices with information and perspective to assist them in 
complex decision-making.8 As observed by Justice Black, “[m]ost case 
before [the] Court involve matters that affect far more people than the 
immediate record parties.”9 
This Comment studies the jurisprudential history and influence of 
amicus curiae briefs filed by the Chamber with the Court. Part II traces 
the number of amicus briefs filed by the Chamber through the decades 
and the corresponding rulings by the Court on related free-enterprise and 
corporate issues. This Comment will analyze how often the Court has 
cited the Chamber’s amicus briefs, and the perceived impact the briefs 
filed by the Chamber have on the Justices’ opinions. Part III discusses the 
prominent business interests promoted by the Chamber and the influence 
such amicus briefs have on the Court in determining whether to grant 
certiorari, and if so, what interests are at the forefront of the Justices’ and 
in turn, the nation’s concerns. Part III also normatively comments on the 
extent to which the Chamber’s amicus activity influences the Court, and 
raises the question as to whether the Court’s pro-business orientation is 
driving the Chamber’s amicus activity or vice versa. 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. Zachary Roth, How the Chamber of Commerce Conquered the Supreme Court, MSNBC (May 
2, 2013), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/how-the-chamber-commerce-conquered-the-sup. 
 5. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the 
Supreme Court, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743, 746 (2000).  
 6. Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 Va. L. Rev. 1901, 1910 (2017). 
 7. Id.  
 8. Amicus Briefs in the Supreme Court, MAYER BROWN, 
https://www.mayerbrown.com/amicus-briefs-in-the-supreme-court/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2017). 
 9. Id.  
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BACKGROUND 
In the first few decades of the twentieth century, outside groups filed 
amicus curiae briefs with the Court in as few as 10% of cases.10 Yet, by 
the end of the century, outside groups filed amicus briefs in nearly 85% 
of cases.11 Today, in the twenty-first century, outside groups file nearly 
one thousand amicus briefs each year, averaging close to fourteen cases, 
per diem.12 This significant increase raises the question as to the perceived 
influence of such friend of the court briefs on the U.S. Supreme Court. 
While almost anyone can submit an unsolicited brief, most lawyers and 
academics are amenable towards briefs, viewing them as helpful to the 
extent that they provide courts with arguments or facts not raised by the 
litigants.13 Justices sitting on the Court admit that secondary resources, 
like amicus briefs, provide “useful knowledge . . . in a world community 
grappling with the same difficult question.”14 Codified at Sup. Ct. R. 37.1, 
an amicus brief “brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not 
already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help 
to the Court,” which explicitly encourages arguments and claims outside 
of what the adversary system provides.15  
 In 1971, two months prior to his appointment as a Supreme Court 
Justice, Lewis Powell, as a private attorney in Richmond, Virginia, 
penned “Attack on American Free Enterprise System.”16 This private 
memorandum to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has since established 
the blueprint for Supreme Court litigation followed by the Chamber.17 
The memorandum urged the Chamber to defend the American economic 
system by specifically focusing on petitions to the Court.18 Justice Powell 
viewed the Court as “the most important instrument for social, economic, 
and political change,” and recommended that the Chamber enlist “a 
highly competent staff of lawyers. . . , lawyers of national standing and 
reputation” to not only represent the Chamber’s interests, but also to serve 
 
 10. Kearney, supra note 5, at 744. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, The Supreme Court’s Reliance on Amicus Curiae 
in the 2012-13 Term, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 18, 2013), https://www.law360.com/in-depth/articles/84695. 
 13. Zachary Mider, How ‘Friends’ of the Court Can Tip the Scales of Justice, Bloomberg Politics 
(September 12, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-12/how-court-friends-can-tip-
the-scales-of-justice-quicktake-q-a. 
 14. David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David S. Tatel, & Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court 
and Useful Knowledge: Panel Discussion at the Supreme Court and Useful Knowledge Symposium, (Nov. 
15, 2008), in Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, at 299, Vol. 154, No. 3 (Sept. 2010).  
 15. Orr, supra note 6, at 1913-14. 
 16. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming 
the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 Geo. L.J. 1487, 1505-06 (2008). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 1505. 
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amicus to “select [ ] the cases in which to participate, or the suits to 
initiate.”19 
First, this section traces the legitimization of the Chamber’s advocacy 
efforts and current level of its expertise and efficacy. Factors, including 
the organization of the Chamber’s litigation center, the Chamber’s key 
players, as well the make-up of the Court contribute to the increased 
sophistication of the Chamber’s litigation efforts as a critical amicus for 
corporate partners. This section also examines the Chamber’s 
participation in litigation at the Supreme Court level, in terms of the 
number of amicus briefs filed on behalf of corporate partners in the most 
recent October 2017 Term. Finally, this section concludes with recent 
cases in which the Chamber filed amicus briefs and discusses metrics 
useful to gauge the Chamber’s influence on the Court.  
Legitimizing the Advocacy Efforts of the Chamber 
The advocacy efforts of the Chamber are unprecedented in terms of the 
dramatic increase in the number of amicus brief filings, as well as the 
success of the cases in which the Chamber has participated as a “friend of 
the Court.” The legitimization of these efforts trace back to the mid-1970s 
and the Chamber’s success continues to trend upward as the Court reflects 
a pro-business orientation in its rulings.20 In 1977, the National Chamber 
Litigation Center (NCLC) formed as an affiliate of the Chamber to 
advocate for businesses at every level of the U.S. judicial system and 
continues to be staffed by in-house litigators, several of whom are former 
U.S. Supreme Court clerks,21 including a clerk who assisted Chief Justice 
John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito during their confirmation 
hearings.22 The NCLC provides legal assistance to businesses with issues 
including class actions, arbitration, labor and employment, energy and 
environment, securities and corporate governance, financial regulation, 
free speech, preemption, government contracts, and criminal law.23 The 
NCLC, which is often compared to a boutique law firm with attorneys 
who rival those of elite K Street firms, is often recognized for influencing 
the Roberts Court’s pro-business decisions.24 In June 1977, the NCLC 
filed its first brief on the merits in the Supreme Court.25 During the 
 
 19. Id. at 1505-06. See Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell to Mr. Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Director 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971). 
 20. Roth, supra note 4.  
 21. Who We Are, U.S. Chamber Litigation Center, http://www.chamberlitigation.com/who-we-are 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2017). 
 22. Shiffman, supra note 1. 
 23. Who We Are, supra note 21. 
 24. Shiffman, supra note 1. 
 25. Lazarus, supra note 16, at 1506.  
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October 1987 Term, the Chamber filed twelve amicus briefs in support of 
business interests in nine cases. 26 Nearly twenty years later, during the 
October 2005 and 2006 Terms, the Chamber served as either amicus or 
party in fifteen cases before the Court.27 
In 2010, Chamber CEO Thomas Donohue overhauled the NCLC’s 
legal team and replaced leadership with former Bush Administration 
appointees.28 Donohue hired Lily Fu Claffee, a senior Bush official and 
former hiring partner at Mayer Brown as the Executive Vice President of 
the NCLC, as well as four Harvard Law graduates to serve in executive 
roles.29 As a result, the Chamber has become a more active body before 
the U.S. judicial system, namely in front of the U.S. Supreme Court.30 
The Chamber continues to hire outside counsel to assist with brief writing, 
and annually increases its filings nationwide to advance pro-business 
decisions by the Court, as well as with the lower courts.31 As a matter of 
policy, however, the Chamber does not participate in those cases in which 
businesses are pitted against each other as adversaries in the judicial 
system, such as patent and anti-trust cases before the Court.32  
 From January 2006 to 2009, with the elevation of Justice Samuel 
Alito, the Court decided forty-three cases in which the Chamber filed a 
brief as either a party or as amicus. Of those cases, the party supported by 
the Chamber prevailed in thirty cases, or a success rate of nearly 70%.33 
Moreover, twelve of the Chamber’s thirty victories during this period 
were unanimous; and in eight more victories, the Chamber, or the party it 
supported, garnered either seven or eight votes from sitting Justices.34 In 
contrast, during the last eleven years of the Rehnquist Court (1994-2005), 
the Chamber’s success rate was 62% (forty-seven wins out of seventy-six 
cases).35  
From a qualitative standpoint, briefs filed by the Chamber are viewed 
not only as successful, but also influential on the Court. A partner at 
Sidley Austin and prominent member of the Supreme Court bar 
commented that, “[t]he briefs filed by the Chamber . . . are uniformly 
excellent. . . . [e]xcept for the Solicitor General representing the United 
States, no single entity has more influence on what cases the Supreme 
 
 26. Id. at 1507-08. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Shiffman, supra note 1.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court? Explaining the Chamber of 
Commerce’s Success at the Roberts Court, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1019, 1023-24 (2009). 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 1019-20.  
 35. Id. at 1024. 
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Court decides and how it decides them than the National Chamber 
Litigation Center.”36 While this conclusion about the influence of the 
Chamber is subjective, other objective efforts to assess the efficacy of 
amicus briefs filed with the Supreme Court are less definitive.37 Some 
interest groups file amicus briefs without much concern about which side 
will prevail, but rather demonstrate to their members that they are 
“bulldogs” staying on the forefront of issues important to their respective 
members.38  However, the Chamber, as the nation’s preeminent business-
oriented lobbying group, is vested in presenting to their members not only 
that it is an active participant in litigation, but more so that it prevails as 
an effective advocate for its corporate members.39  
The art of filing amicus briefs is not a one-man-show. The Chamber 
does not always or even usually file amicus briefs independently. Rather, 
the Chamber files briefs in tandem with one or more other interest groups 
or associations to promote business interests.40 Evidence41 has been found 
that amicus briefs filed jointly are more likely to be accepted and 
discussed by the Court.42 In the 2017 case of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 
Superior Court, both the Chamber of Commerce and the U.S. Solicitor 
General filed amicus briefs in support of defendant pharmaceutical 
company, Bristol-Myers Squibb.43 The Court found for Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, holding that there was no personal jurisdiction to entertain 
nonresidents’ claims. The Chamber filed its amicus brief jointly with the 
California Chamber of Commerce, the American Tort Reform 
Association, and the Civil Justice Association of California.44 This recent 
case demonstrates how solidarity among related interest groups can 
influence the Court through effective and consistent petitioning.  
The Chamber files amicus briefs at all levels of the U.S. court system, 
from state and federal court, to the U.S. Supreme Court to promote pro-
business and/or deregulatory actions.45 While this Comment focuses on 
 
 36. Id. at 1025-26. 
 37. Id. at 1026. 
 38. Id. at 1026-27. 
 39. Id. 
 40. U.S. Supreme Court Amicus, U.S. Chamber Litigation Center, 
http://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases/bristol-myers-squibb-co-v-superior-court-0. 
 41. See Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary 
Empirical Assessment, 14 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 43, 69-72 (2006). 
 42. Michael E. Solimine, Article: State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development of 
Federalism Doctrine, 46 Ga. L. Rev. 355, 366 (Winter 2012). 
 43. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, U.S. Chamber Litigation Center, 
http://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases/bristol-myers-squibb-co-v-superior-court-0 (last visited Sept. 
23, 2017).; 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 44. Id. 
 45. U.S. Chamber Litigation Center, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
https://www.uschamber.com/us-chamber-litigation-center (last visited Sept. 23, 2017). 
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the Chamber’s amicus briefs filed at the Supreme Court level, it would be 
remiss to not mention the Chamber is an active filer at both the lower 
federal and state court levels, as well.46  For instance, the Tenth Circuit 
recently dismissed an appeal of final judgment against the Bureau of Land 
Management’s hydraulic fracturing rule for being “prudentially unripe” 
in light of the Trump administration’s intention to repeal the rule.47 
Despite the Tenth Circuit’s ruling, the Chamber filed an amicus brief to 
enjoin the Bureau’s regulations in the case.48  
For the past ten years, not only have scholars and Court observers noted 
the Chamber’s increasing involvement with cases, but also its increased 
willingness to voice its’ members interests.49 As suggested by a blogger 
who comments on the Court, the Chamber’s high level of activity and 
success at the certiorari stage reflect its efforts to shape the Roberts 
Court’s dwindling docket.50 As suggested by one political blogger, the 
most active amici are generally pro-business and anti-regulatory groups, 
such as the Chamber. 51 This trend is likely a product of these groups’ 
enhanced financial ability to afford certiorari stage briefs, as a corollary 
to the liberal, left-leaning interest groups that tend to file far fewer 
briefs.52 The rising tide of judicial deference to amici has inevitably led 
to the Court’s new “open door” policy to “friends of the court.”53  
Scholars and legal academics attempt to explain judicial decisions in 
terms of legal doctrine or ideological preferences. However, other 
scholars suggest that the Justices, particularly those sitting on the Roberts 
Court, are driven by attitudes about the law that are not necessarily rooted 
in doctrinal understandings of the law.54 The seemingly pro-business 
attitude that characterizes the Roberts Court has been suggested to not 
merely reflect a free enterprise bias, but rather highlights an overriding 
“skepticism about litigation as a mode of regulation.”55 As one scholar 
opines in his article, “businesses seem to fare especially well when they 
 
 46. U.S. Chamber Litigation Center, supra note 32. 
 47. Brief for Amicus Curiae The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in 
Support of Appellees and Affirmance, State of Wyoming v. Zinke, U.S. Department of the Interior, Np. 
16-8068 (10th Cir. 2017); State of Wyoming v. Zinke, U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Chamber of 
Litigation Center, http://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases/state-wyoming-v-jewell-us-department-
interior (last visited Nov. 30, 2017).  
 48. Id. 
 49. Adam Chandler, Cert.-stage Amicus Briefs: Who Files Them and to What Effect?, SCOTUS 
Blog (Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/cert-stage-amicus-briefs-who-files-them-and-to-
what-effect-2/. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Kearney, supra note 5, at 762-63. 
 54. Franklin, supra note 32, at 1056. 
 55. Id. at 1021. 
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are defendants; even better when the justices appear to view the litigation 
in question as having broader regulatory goals as opposed to individual 
remedial objectives; and better still when the justices view the litigation 
as lawyer-driven rather than party-driven.”56 The conservative 
characterization of the Court’s recent judgments is merely an observation. 
However, this presumption is not unfounded as evidenced by the Court’s 
continued rulings in favor of deregulation and pro-business interests.57 
The Current State of the Pro-Business Roberts Court 
Political science and legal scholars agree that while the current Justices 
sitting on the Supreme Court are clearly divided on most issues, the 
Roberts Court largely supports corporate interests irrespective of the 
Justices’ political affiliations.58 While on one hand the Chamber is filing 
amicus briefs at an unprecedented rate, the business-friendly orientation 
of the Justices sitting on the bench is a contributing factor to the 
Chamber’s success at its Supreme Court-level amicus filings.59 It is this 
current judicial climate which is favorable to the Chamber and its 
corporate partner litigants, and in turn, enables the Chamber to prevail in 
Court more often than not.  
The Chamber continues to besiege the Court, filing ten amicus briefs 
since the beginning of the October 2017 Term.60 Of the fifteen decisions 
handed down by the Supreme Court this year, and for which the Chamber 
filed briefs, all but one of the decisions were favorable to the litigants 
supported by the amici.61 While it is not possible to precisely gauge the 
degree of influence these briefs have on the Justices and their clerks when 
writing their opinions, the Justices admit that amicus briefs do, in fact, 
play an influential role when difficult questions arise and when the 
Justices are looking for a “non-interested” party perspective on an issue.62  
However, some spectators of the Court argue that the Chamber is “no 
friend of the Court.”63 Parties in opposition to the Chamber’s stance insist 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Feldman, supra note 2. 
 58. Id. See also Roth, supra note 4.  
 59. Roth, supra note 4. 
 60. U.S. Supreme Court Amicus, U.S. CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER , 
http://www.chamberlitigation.com/what-we-do (last visited Sept. 24, 2017). 
 61. Id.; Betsy Emmert, The Corporate Clique in the Courtroom: A Jurisprudential Study of The 
Success and Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs Filed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Oct. 1, 2017) 
(unpublished research, University of Cincinnati) (on file with author). 
 62. Souter, supra note 14, at 299. 
 63. Alison Frankel, “U.S Chamber is not friend of the court: TCPA plaintiffs to 11th Circuit,” 
Reuters: #Intel, (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-chamber/u-s-chamber-is-no-
friend-of-the-court-tcpa-plaintiffs-to-11th-circuit-idUSKCN1B1237. 
8
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss1/7
2018] CORPORATE CLIQUE IN THE COURTROOM 235 
that the Chamber is not a friend, but instead suggest that the relations 
among parties, lawyers, and amici are impermissible.64 In 2017, two 
plaintiffs’ firms made attempts to block proposed amicus briefs filed by 
the Chamber on the ground that the Chamber was not a legitimate amicus. 
The Court accepted an amicus brief from the Chamber in DirecTV, LLC 
v. Hall, which urged the Court to grant certiorari to resolve the standard 
of joint employment under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).65 The 
plaintiff’s counsel sought to delegitimize the Chamber in court, arguing 
that the Chamber was too tightly tied to the defendant.66 In actuality, the 
plaintiff’s counsel argued that the Chamber was not an impartial amicus, 
but rather, a party because DirecTV is a dues-paying member of the 
Chamber, and DirecTV’s lead appellate counsel had represented the 
Chamber in over fifty cases, including appeals where counsel drafted 
Chamber amicus briefs in support of DirecTV.67 In this case, and 
countless others,68 the Chamber arguably crosses the line between “an 
uninterested party” and “more than a friend” when filing amicus briefs on 
behalf of its corporate partners, who also financially support the Chamber.  
With the ever-increasing number of amicus briefs filed by corporate 
advocacy groups, impartiality from frequent amicus filers is not a realistic 
expectation in today’s judicial climate.69 In response to such pushback, 
the Chamber contends that suppression of amicus filings by interest 
groups could be unconstitutional as proposed rules by plaintiffs’ counsels 
to ban trade associations from filing briefs would impair interest groups’ 
First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition the government.70 
Despite this pushback, the Chamber continues to successfully file more 
amicus briefs than almost any other national interest group at the Supreme 
Court level.71 
DISCUSSION 
 First, it is useful to look at the Chamber’s amicus success rates through 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. DirecTV, LLC v. Hall, U.S. Chamber Litigation Center (last visited Sept. 24, 2017), 
http://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases/directv-llc-v-hall. 
 66. Frankel, supra note 63. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Recent Activity, U.S. CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER, 
http://www.chamberlitigation.com/recent-activity (last visited Nov. 19, 2017). 
 69. Frankel, supra note 63. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Debra Cassens Weiss, US Chamber Remains Champion of Cert-Stage Amicus ‘All-Stars’, 
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the decades to determine during which terms the Court was more 
receptive to pro-business interests than others. Second, it is critical to 
identify those cases in which the Court directly cites to the amicus briefs 
filed by the Chamber. Direct citations serve as another revealing indicator 
of effective advocacy by the Chamber, as well as of the interests which 
the Court finds most important. Third, it is necessary to understand which 
business interests on which the Chamber and the Court align, and on 
which interests the Court diverges from the Chamber to fully grasp the 
activity and corresponding influence of the Chamber. Finally, Part III 
explains what impact a business-friendly Court currently has during the 
Roberts Court era, as well as normatively comments on other factors that 
may influence the Court in its pending decisions.  
A Linear Analysis of the Chamber’s Litigation Activity 
Due to the large number of amicus briefs filed by the Chamber, not 
only this year, but over the past three decades, the most comprehensive 
manner to analyze the success of the Chamber’s amicus activity and the 
Justices’ receptivity to these briefs is to: (1) examine the Chamber’s 
activity decade by decade; (2) look to the specific -- albeit rare – instances 
in which the Court cites to the Chamber’s briefs in its decision; and (3) 
identify those business interests in which the Chamber commonly 
prevails, as well as those interests in which the Chamber rarely succeeds 
at the Supreme Court-level.  
Through the Decades 
Since its founding forty years ago in 1977, the NCLC has caught the 
attention of the Justices by filing amicus curiae briefs to advocate for 
business interests, ranging from deregulation to free speech.72 
Admittedly, landmark civil rights cases relating to topics such as abortion 
or the death penalty are more likely to gain public attention than corporate 
interest cases entertained by the Court. Nevertheless, such pro-business 
cases have lasting ramifications on the nation’s corporate landscape and 
entities.73 However, since Chief Justice Roberts took the bench on 
September 25, 2005, the Chamber’s role as a “friend of the Court” has 
shifted from a seemingly mere acquaintance to something more akin to a 
 
 72. Who We Are, supra note 21. 
 73. Doug Kendall, Not So Risky Business: The Chamber of Commerce’s Quiet Success Before the 
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close confidant.74 
During the era of the Burger Court, from 1981 to 1986, the Chamber 
prevailed in approximately 43% of the cases for which it filed amicus 
briefs.75 The Court warmed up to the Chamber during the Rehnquist Court 
(1994 to 2005), during which the Chamber’s interests have prevailed in 
approximately 56% of the cases for which it filed amicus briefs.76 
Currently, during the era of the Roberts Court, the Chamber prevails in 
nearly 70% of the cases for which it files briefs.77 The Court’s receptivity 
to the Chamber’s promoted interests signifies a gradual shift towards an 
increasingly deregulated, pro-business jurisprudential environment. What 
fuels this trend, though, is a combination of internal and external factors 
that create the optimal environment for the Chamber to effectively 
petition the Court. 
Part of the Chamber’s success can be attributed to external factors 
beyond the Chamber’s control. For instance, the balance of the Court 
itself plays a significant role in the outcome of business-related cases. 
Traditionally, “conservative” justices tend to vote in favor of business 
interests, while “liberal” justices are more likely to vote against business 
interests.78 Since Justice Alito succeeded Justice O’Connor on the bench 
in January 2006, the Chamber has experienced a 70% success rate in 
representing its business counterparts, compared to its less impressive 
track records during the Burger and Rehnquist eras.79 Studies reveal that 
of the current Justices sitting on the bench, Justice Sotomayor is least 
favorable to business interests. However, she still ranks moderately 
liberal on her business rulings among previous Democratic-appointed 
Justices.80  
During the October 2017 term, the Court granted certiorari to even 
more business-dispute cases. Judicial spectators noted the inherent 
paradox in the Court hearing an increasing number of business-interest 
cases, even after the passing of the late Justice Scalia, who admittedly 
thought such business cases were “boring.”81 However, Justice Scalia 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. The data of the success rate of briefs filed by the Chamber during the Roberts Court era 
reflects the Chamber’s success rate from 2006-2013. 
 78. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme 
Court, 97 Minn. L.Rev. 1431, 1433 (April 2013). 
 79. The US Chamber of Commerce Continues its Winning Ways, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER (June 30, 2014), https://theusconstitution.org/text-history/2753/us-chamber-
commerce-continues-its-winning-ways. 
 80. Epstein, supra note 78, at 1449-52; Nick Wells, “The US Supreme Court is more friendly to 
businesses than any time since World War II,” CNBC: The Big Crunch (March 1, 2017 at 3:10 p.m.), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/01/supreme-court-very-business-friendly-data-show.html. 
 81. Mark Chenoweth, “The Supreme Court’s NOT Top 10: October 2016 Cert Petitions The 
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consistently voted in line with pro-business and open market interests, 
despite his distaste for these less than exciting cases.82 Although other 
current liberal justices, including Breyer and Ginsburg, tend to vote 
against business interests in 5-4 decisions, by and large, the Roberts Court 
is highly pro-business, with conservative justices very supportive of 
business and the liberal justices voting only moderately liberal in 
comparison to previous eras.83   
A phenomenon that also works to the Chamber’s advantage is that the 
number of cases reviewed and heard by the Supreme Court continues to 
decline.84 In the October 2017 Term, the Court heard thirty-nine cases 
argued. In the Spring 2013 Term, the Court heard seventy-six cases as 
compared to the typical average of 150 cases heard per term in the 
1980s.85  As the Court’s docket lightens and the Court continues to grant 
certiorari to business-related cases, the Chamber’s voice is only 
amplified, contributing to its unprecedented success rate among its 
peers.86 As evidenced by the combination of the Chamber’s increased 
participation as an amicus since the founding of the NCLC, with those 
external factors beyond the Chamber’s control, the Chamber’s influence 
has significantly expanded since its formalization of its litigation efforts 
to advance its corporate partners’ interests at the Supreme Court. 
Citations by the Court 
Legal scholars and researchers contend that one of the best indicators 
of the effectiveness or actual influence of an amicus is by tracking those 
opinions in which the Court textually cites to the amicus’s brief.87 The 
data collected over the past three terms provides a snapshot of the Roberts 
Court’s activity and serves as one of several metrics88 which gauge the 
 
Justices Should Have Granted,” FORBES, (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2017/07/25/the-supreme-courts-not-top-10-october-term-2016-cert-
petitions-the-justices-should-have-granted/#295796fa2723. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Epstein, supra note 78, at 1449. 
 84. Kendall, supra note 73. 
 85. Supreme Court of the United States Granted & Noted List Cases for Argument in October 
Term 2017, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/grantednotedlist/17grantednotedlist; see also Kendall, supra note 73. 
 86. Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 
4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-defining-this-
supreme-court.html?hp&_r=0; Oliver Roeder, The Supreme Court’s Caseload Is On Track To Be The 
Lightest In 70 Years, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 17, 2016 at 9:00 a.m.), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-supreme-courts-caseload-is-on-track-to-be-the-lightest-in-70-
years/. 
 87. Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends?: Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 
20 J.L. & Politics 33, 34-35 (Winter 2004). 
 88. City of L.A. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. (2015); City of Los Angeles v. Patel, U.S. CHAMBER 
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impact and influence of the Chamber on the Court as an amicus. On one 
hand, the sheer number of amicus briefs filed by the Chamber illustrates 
its support of its corporate members on the judicial level. On the other 
hand, the Court’s rulings demonstrate its position on the interests 
represented in the cases that are granted certiorari. Although it easier to 
quantify the number of “influential” amicus briefs filed by the Chamber 
by identifying those cases for which the Court ruled in favor of or against 
the Chamber’s purported interests, tracking those cases in which the 
Justices cite to, or better yet, quote the Chamber of Commerce in the 
opinion itself is a significantly more precise barometer.89  
Of those cases decided on the merits during 2014-2016 Terms and for 
which the Chamber filed an amicus brief, the Chamber was cited, 
however, in only one case.90  A relatively recent example of such a 
citation appears in the landmark political expenditures case, Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission.91 In a rather rare instance, Justice 
Kennedy referenced the amicus brief filed by the Chamber, when 
discussing the chilling effect of political speech prohibitions on small 
businesses.92 The Court cites to the Chamber’s brief in two separate 
instances: first, for the proposition that most members (96%) of the 
Chamber are small businesses, and second, to support the argument that 
the Government did not claim that political expenditures made by these 
small businesses have corrupted the political process.93 In Citizens 
United, the Court clearly was influenced by the Chamber’s amicus brief, 
as evidenced by the explicit citations to the amicus brief in support of its 
decision to reverse the district court’s judgment regarding the 
constitutionality of the 2 U.S.C. §441b restrictions on corporate 
independent expenditures.94 
Again, the Chamber wielded its influence and the Court recognized the 
Chamber’s position in the case of City of Los Angeles v. Patel, in which 
the Court rejected warrantless, suspicionless searches of business 
records.95 Given the relative rarity in which the Court cites amicus briefs 
 
LITIGATION CENTER, http://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases/city-los-angeles-v-patel (last visited Oct. 
16, 2017) (the Supreme Court cited the Chamber’s amicus curiae brief in the 2015 case of City of L.A. v. 
Patel).  
 89. Id. 
 90. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2455 (2015).  
 91. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354-57 (2010) (citing the Chamber of Commerce’s 
amicus brief urging the Court preserve business interests under the standard of Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)). 
 92. Id. at 354. 
 93. Id. at 354, 357. 
 94. Id. at 372. 
 95. City of L.A. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2455 (2015); City of Los Angeles v. Patel, U.S. 
CHAMBER LIITGATION CENTER, http://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases/city-los-angeles-v-patel (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2017).  
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in its opinions, the Court’s citation calls into question the correlation of 
amicus filings and the “success” of the amici based on the Court’s ruling. 
For instance, Justice Sotomayor relies on the Chamber’s brief filed on 
behalf of Google, Inc. to explain that the exception to normal Fourth 
Amendment rules for a “pervasively regulated” business is narrow.96 
Although Patel is a paradigm in which the influence of the Chamber is 
clearly reflected in the Court’s opinion, it is not only possible, but also 
necessary to look to other indicators of the degree of influence of the 
Chamber’s amicus briefs on the Court. 
Business Interests of the Court and the Chamber 
A third component to consider when examining the Chamber’s activity 
in the Court relates to specific business interests advanced by the 
Chamber in its amicus briefs. The data collected for this Comment 
illustrates the sheer number of cases in which the Chamber has 
participated at the merits filing stage, in addition to the business interests 
that resonate most with the Chamber, and in turn, with the Court.97 
The business interests advanced by the Chamber fall under a broad 
array of interests, ranging from class actions, to tort reform, to arbitration, 
and to bankruptcy.98 From the Chamber’s perspective, the issues of 
administrative law, jurisdiction and procedure, employment, and class 
actions have been of paramount importance in recent years.99 Not all or 
even most of the cases for which the Chamber participates in the filing of 
an amicus brief does the Court grant certiorari or decide the case on the 
merits. Of the fifty-five cases reviewed and decided by the Supreme Court 
since the 2014 Term, and for which the Chamber has filed an amicus brief, 
the Court has ruled in favor of the Chamber in thirty-seven cases – a 
success rate of 67%. This success rate is indicative of the Roberts Court’s 
receptivity to business interests and proclivity to align with corporate 
interests advocated by the Chamber.  
Since the 2014 Term, administrative law stands as the most common 
business interest among the cases on which the Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari and decided the case on the merits, as reflected in Table 
1. Administrative law, as a category, encompasses those cases that 
 
 96. City of L.A. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2455 (2015);  City of Los Angeles v. Patel, U.S. 
CHAMBER LIITGATION CENTER, http://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases/city-los-angeles-v-patel (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2017). 
 97. Betsy Emmert, The Corporate Clique in the Courtroom: A Jurisprudential Study of The 
Success and Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs Filed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Oct. 1, 2017) 
(unpublished research, University of Cincinnati) (on file with author). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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involve disputes such as SEC disgorgement claims,100 violations of the 
Federal Vacancies Reform Act,101 and questions of public disclosure 
under the Bipartisan Campaign Act of 2002.102 Of the twenty-two cases 
relating to administrative law, thirteen of those cases resulted in 
“successes” for the Chamber and its corporate partners.103  
Following the business interest of administrative law, the second-most 
common business interest for which the Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari and delivered a decision is related to benefits and 
compensation.104 Within this category, both interests relating to Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and employment, and the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) were 
granted certiorari and decided on the merits by the Supreme Court.  Of 
the cases related to the benefits and compensation, EECO and 
employment, and ERISA categories, the Court ruled in favor of the 
corporate interests in eleven out of the twenty cases for which the 
Chamber filed a brief the Court delivered a decision on the merits. 
 
 100. See Kokesch v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017).  
 101. See NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 267 (2016). 
 102. See Indep. Inst. v. FEC, 137 S. Ct. 267 (2016). 
 103. Emmert, supra note 97. 
 104. Id. 
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Table 1: Snapshot of Related Business Interests in Cases 
Decided on the Merits and for which the Chamber of 
Commerce Filed an Amicus Brief (2014-2017 Terms)
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Of the thirty-seven cases in which the Chamber has prevailed in 
advocating for a business interest during the 2014-2016 Terms, nearly 
half (seventeen) of those briefs have been jointly filed with one or more 
other interest groups. Some of the Chamber’s most successful amici 
include the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), the 
Business Roundtable, and the American Tort Reform Association. 
Nevertheless, the relatively equal distribution of success between those 
briefs filed separately and jointly with other business-related interest 
groups does not conclusively indicate that one approach is necessarily 
more influential on the Court. Perhaps filing jointly with other related 
interest groups is a merely an economical, efficient, and impactful 
alterative manner to petition the Court.  
Moreover, the Chamber works closely with outside counsel on nearly 
all its amicus briefs. Some of the nation’s most prominent firms and 
lawyers serve as co-counsel with the NCLC when crafting these amicus 
briefs, such as Mayer Brown LLP, Jones Day, and Consovoy McCarthy 
Park PLLC.  Moreover, the data reveals that during the 2014-2016 Terms, 
the Chamber prevailed at an average annual rate of 70% during the 2014 
to 2016 terms, consistent with its performance since Chief Justice Roberts 
took the bench in 2005.105 As Table 2 demonstrates, since 2014, business 
interests that the Chamber “champions” tend to triumph in Court more 
often than fail when the Chamber files amicus briefs.  
However, not all business interests for which the Chamber advocates 
 
























































Table 2: Chamber of Commerce Success by Term
In Favor Against
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appear to fare equally as well as others. Although the data collected 
between the 2014 and 2016 Terms does not reflect a long-spanning trend, 
business interests including health care, tax litigation, and jurisdiction and 
procedure have traditionally been disfavored by the Court in recent years. 
Of the seventeen cases in which the Court has ruled against the Chamber, 
six of those decisions have either been 9 to 0 or 8 to 1 decisions and only 
three of the decisions have been 5 to 4 decisions. Notably, the Court has 
delivered adverse decisions to the Chamber’s interests in 9 to 0 in cases 
relating to employment-related issues, primarily pertaining to Benefits 
and Compensation.106 The issues on which the Court splits generally 
relate to administrative law and government litigation, as opposed to 
issues relating to health care wherein the Court has recently ruled against 
the interests advanced by the Chamber.  
The Impact of a “Business-Friendly” Court 
The Chamber is, indeed, a “friend of the Court,” as evidenced by its 
recent and continuing success in Supreme Court litigation. However, the 
current and future impact of a pro-business Court is far from a model of 
clarity.107 Inherent danger exists when attributing the Chamber’s success 
only to the conservative tilt of the Roberts Court. The presumption that 
the Court reflexively rules in favor of the Chamber is too simplistic given 
the multitude of other factors that influence the Justices. First, the 
politically neutral presence of the NCLC counters the argument that the 
“conservative” Chamber grabs the attention of the conservative Roberts 
Court. The NCLC manages to present its business positions in a facially 
neutral manner, vis-à-vis its virtual presence and in its amicus filings.108 
Moreover, the litigation strategies utilized by the Chamber indicate that 
the NCLC is keen to participate as amicus in cases that are likely to prevail 
in court, while avoiding participating in those cases that the Chamber 
perceives as less likely to succeed on the merits.109 Second, various 
external factors, in addition to amicus briefs filed on behalf of corporate 
litigants, likely influence the Court. The salience of the Chamber’s briefs 
is likely diluted by pressure from political parties, media outlets, and case 
precedent. Therefore, this Comment suggests that perhaps, the “corporate 
clique” between the Chamber and the Court is less a product of the 
Chamber’s amicus activity, and rather a product of external dynamics.    
 
 106. Emmert, supra note 97. 
 107. Adam Liptak, Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests, N.Y. Times (Dec. 18, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/19roberts.html?pagewanted=all. 
 108. Who We Are, supra note 21. 
 109. Kearney, supra note 5 at 750. 
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The Current Impact 
The Court’s decisions during the past three terms cumulatively reflect 
the pro-business orientation of the Roberts Court, as echoed by political 
science scholars and judicial reporters alike.110 However, when 
examining the data collected over this short period of time and comparing 
it to the broader trends of amicus activity by the Chamber over the past 
decade, the direct impact of the Chamber on the Court is less dramatic 
than some scholars and reporters suggest.111 The sparse number of 
citations to the Chamber’s briefs in the Court’s opinions, the politically 
neutral positions taken by the NCLC, and the lack of first-hand 
acknowledgement by the Justices and/or their clerks of the influence of 
amicus briefs implies that the Chamber’s actual influence on the Court 
cannot be clearly confirmed or denied. 
The Chamber is rarely cited by the Court, in comparison to the number 
of briefs filed by the Chamber in support of various business interests.112 
While scholars opine on the rise of judicial activity by the Chamber and 
the Roberts Court’s apparent favoritism towards corporations, these same 
scholars fail to provide substantial research or commentary on the 
frequency of the Court’s direct citation to Chamber briefs – a better litmus 
test for the actual influence of the Chamber of the Justices.113 As 
illustrated in Part A of the Discussion, the Court infrequently cites to 
amicus briefs, and the Chamber’s briefs are no exception to this 
phenomenon. Rather, it may be more accurate to reframe the tendency of 
the Court to rule in favor of the Chamber’s business interests as a 
reflection of the Justices’ broadly shared vision that litigation is not the 
ideal mode of regulation.114 
Another indicator of the Court’s diluted impact on the Court relates to 
the NCLC’s politically neutral stance. As an affiliate of the Chamber, the 
NCLC refrains from blatantly advocating for “conservative” interests in 
front of the Court. The former Executive Vice-President of the NCLC 
commented that the Court relies on briefs filed by the Chamber because 
it is a “credible voice for business,” as opposed to being a purely political 
affiliated proponent.115 Unlike the Chamber’s other affiliate, Institute for 
Legal Reform (ILR), which supports civil justice reform, the NCLC 
website remains politically neutral and transparent in its success rates at 
 
 110. Chandler, supra note 49; Franklin, supra note 32.  
 111. Liptak, supra note 86.  
 112. Emmert, supra note 97.  
 113. Kendall, supra note 73. This CAA article provides commentary on the Roberts’ Court’s pro-
business orientation during the 2012-2013 terms. It does not, however, discuss cases that cite amicus 
briefs filed by the Chamber as an indicator of influence on the Roberts’ Court. 
 114. Franklin, supra note 32, at 1054-55. 
 115. Liptak, supra note 107. 
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every level of litigation.116 The ILR advocates for many of the same issues 
as the Chamber, but unlike the Chamber, the ILR expressly claims to 
“shine[] a light on what is wrong in the legal system.”117 In stark contrast, 
the NCLC website refrains from political dialogue, and instead provides 
readers with a database of case information for nearly every amicus brief 
filed by the Chamber, with information regarding the disposition of the 
case, the court from which the case was appealed, and a synopsis of the 
case’s main issues. Although it is difficult to determine the Court’s 
perception of the Chamber, it is possible that the Court views the Chamber 
and the NCLC arm as less politically-motivated, focused primarily on 
promoting free enterprise and deregulation. By simple comparison, the 
NCLC appears more neutral in terms of its goals, motivations, and broad 
range of business issues, as compared to the relatively more specific 
issues for which the ILR zealously advocates.118 
As reflected by the data collected for this study, the true impact of the 
amicus briefs filed by the Chamber is subject to conjecture. Aside from 
rare comments from the Justices themselves or from their clerks, it is 
difficult to understand the impact of the Chamber’s amicus briefs on the 
Court’s determinations.119 While the data collected for the purposes of 
this Comment, and the data collected by other judicial scholars suggest 
that a relationship exists between the frequency with which the Chamber 
files amicus briefs at the Supreme Court level and the orientation of the 
Roberts Court in ruling in favor of the Chamber’s purported interests, 
correlation between the Chamber’s amicus briefs and the Court’s pro-
business decisions does not imply causation, or vice versa.120  
Without additional insight – such as personal testimony by the Justices 
or by their clerks, or textual citation to the Chamber’s briefs in the Court’s 
opinion – a truly bona fide relationship between the Chamber’s amicus 
activity and the Court’s response cannot be definitively established. 
Ancillary factors also must be considered which may skew the public’s 
perception of the impact of the Chamber’s briefs, including the political 
make-up of the Justices, as well as the shrinking docket of the Court.121 
 
 116. About ILR, U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/about-ilr (last visited Oct. 22, 2017).  
 117. Issues, U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). The ILR conducts research and 
advocates for issues, including class actions, False Claims Act (FCA), lawsuit lending, over-enforcement, 
and third party litigation funding (TPLF). The ILR, however, targets reducing “meritless” lawsuits.  
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). The ILR conducts research and 
advocates for issues, including class actions, False Claims Act (FCA), lawsuit lending, over-enforcement, 
and third-party litigation funding (TPLF). The ILR, however, targets reducing “meritless” lawsuits.   
 118. Id. 
 119. Souter, supra note 14. 
 120. Epstein, supra note 78, at 1433. 
 121. Chandler, supra note 49.  
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Legal scholars agree that it is nearly impossible to gauge the true salience 
of the Justices’ pro-business orientation from the outcome of the cases 
alone.122 However, it is fairly unlikely that business interests are of the 
most salience or importance to the Justices, who come largely from public 
sector or academic backgrounds, as opposed to in-house corporate 
counsel positions or private practice.123  
 Table 3 suggests that other factors, such as the litigant’s position as 
petitioner or respondent possibly contributes to the outcome of the cases 
in which the Chamber files amicus briefs.  In 54% of the cases in which 
the Chamber filed a brief and the Court ruled in favor of the Chamber’s 
interests, the Chamber supported the petitioner. Although the data set 
looks specifically at data from the past several years, it is more than likely 
that the Chamber, like other interest groups, chooses to file amicus briefs 
for only those cases which it believes that the litigant(s) has or have a 
relatively high likelihood of winning. The recent trend in the Chamber’s 
success with petitioners may not indicate a strong correlation between the 
litigant’s position, but rather supports the notion that the Chamber 
primarily advocates for corporate litigants with the financial means and 
access to sophisticated legal aid to argue before the Supreme Court.  
It is naïve to assume that the Chamber files briefs for every business-
related case that comes before the Supreme Court. Even though the NCLC 
does not hold a crystal ball to predict the outcome of every case for which 
it files an amicus brief, the seasoned attorneys at the NCLC, as well as its 
co-counsel, understand with which business interests and corporate 
litigants the Chamber will likely have success serving as a “friend of the 
Court.”124  
 
 122. Franklin, supra note 32, at 1055-56. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Liptak, supra note 107 (quoting the now-former Executive Vice-President of the NCLC in 
54%32%
14%
Table 3: The Position Supported by the Chamber in 





University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss1/7
2018] CORPORATE CLIQUE IN THE COURTROOM 247 
External Factors That Influence the Court 
Ultimately, more research must be conducted to evaluate the extent to 
which the Chamber’s amicus briefs impact the Court. Legal scholars and 
Court observers are swift to attribute the Court’s pro-business orientation 
to the Chamber’s increased amicus participation. However, this 
correlation must be observed with caution for several reasons. First, the 
apparent increase in the Chamber’s amicus activity is likely a product of 
the overall trend in increased amicus filings by interest groups.125 Second, 
the Court is likely influenced, to an equal or greater degree, to vote in line 
with business interests because of external or internal pressures beyond 
that of the Chamber’s amicus briefs. Third, the current make-up of the 
Court suggests that political pressure from the Justices’ appointed parties 
also plays a significant role in how the Justices vote on business issues, 
with Republican-affiliated Justices voting overwhelmingly in favor of 
business interests.126 As a result, the true influence and success of the 
Chamber’s amicus briefs must be examined with heightened caution to 
avoid placing undue weight on the Chamber’s advocacy efforts. 
By examining the historical activity and “success” of the Chamber in 
Court, one can identify factors that may influence the Court’s pro-
business orientation in recent years to forecast the future judicial climate. 
Since 1981, during the era of the Burger Court, the Chamber’s success 
rate at the Supreme Court level lagged behind its loss rate until the era of 
the Rehnquist Court. During this period, the success level increased from 
43% to 56%.127 In the early days of the Roberts Court, specifically 
between 2005 and 2013, the success rate of the Chamber climbed to 
nearly 69%.128 While this 13% increase in the Chamber’s success rate in 
Court for its litigious “friends” may appear dramatic at first blush, it is 
possible that other external factors beyond the Chamber’s presupposed 
persuasive briefs played a defining role in the Court’s dispositions.  
Even if the “amicus machine”129 currently trends as a popular tool 
among litigants to effectively petition the Court, it is undeniable that both 
internal and external factors manage to influence the Justices’ final 
decisions. Such factors may include, but are not limited to, the Justices’ 
personal beliefs, time limitations, other branches of government, social 
 
stating that “[t]here has been a return on investment,” in terms of the Chamber’s success in persuading 
the Roberts [C]ourt to take its cases). 
 125. Kearney, supra note 5, at 751. 
 126. Nick Wells, The US Supreme Court is more friendly to businesses than any time since World 
War II, CNBC: The Big Crunch, (March 1, 2017 at 3:10 p.m.), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/01/supreme-court-very-business-friendly-data-show.html. 
 127. Kendall, supra note 73.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Larsen, supra note 6, at 1906. 
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values, public opinions, and judicial philosophy.130 Some legal scholars 
tend to measure the effectiveness of amicus briefs in a vacuum, but rather 
they must be considered in tandem with these other elements to prevent 
the inflation of any single factor’s influence on the Court’s rulings.131 
Thus, the recognition of the interplay of external influences on the Court 
reframes and refracts the recent data relating to the Chamber’s frequent 
amicus activity and the Court’s partiality toward corporate interests.  
What is less clear is whether the current favorable climate for the 
Chamber, as an effective “friend of the Court,” is a singular product of 
the Chamber’s amicus activity, an alternate factor, or some combination 
of factors that influence the Court.132 Although some studies133 suggest 
that amicus participation is related to success at the certiorari and merits 
stage, this correlation does not indicate causation with respect to the 
Chamber’s participation and success in Supreme Court litigation. As 
reflected in the data134 examined for the purposes of this Comment, as 
well as by information collected to study the impact of amicus briefs, at 
large, the actual effect of amicus briefs were likely less impactful than 
amicus-filing interest groups would otherwise like to suggest. As 
evidenced by the publication of amicus activity by the NCLC on its 
website, interest groups, like the Chamber, want to communicate to their 
members and to their partners that they are actively advocating for their 
interests.135 These interest groups are motivated, either in part or in whole, 
by self-serving interests to appear as proactive advocates for their dues-
paying members. By being an “active” amicus, interest groups give the 
appearance of being bulldogs in the courtroom, representing and fighting 
for their members’ interests. While the Chamber and other interest groups 
are propelled by unselfish motivations for their members, it is critical to 
the groups’ public image and persona to frequently participate in high-
profile and relevant litigation.   
As discussed throughout this Comment, the Justices sitting on the 
Supreme Court are more likely to vote in favor of business interests than 
any other Court since World War II.136 Particularly with President 
Trump’s appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch, businesses are likely to 
 
 130. See Larsen, supra note 6; see also Rachel Horne, Factors that Influence Supreme Court 
Decisions, INFOGRAM, https://infogram.com/factors-that-influence-supreme-court-decisions-
1gdx3pwj86qrmgr (last visited Oct. 22, 2017).  
 131. See Feldman, supra note 2. 
 132. Kearney, supra note 5, at 830. 
 133. Franklin, supra note 32, at 1026-27. 
 134. See Emmert, supra note 97 (data collected by and on file with author indicates that during the 
2014 to 2016 Terms, the Roberts Court ruled in favor of corporate interests when the NCLC filed amicus 
briefs on behalf of the Chamber). 
 135. Who We Are, supra note 21. 
 136. Wells, supra note 126. 
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continue to prevail over regulatory interests.137 Gorsuch falls on the 
conservative end of the Court’s spectrum, resembling many of the same 
ideologies of Justice Alito, who also voted in favor of corporate 
interests.138 While Republican-appointed Justices are likely to vote in 
favor of corporate interests, Democratic appointees now are, surprisingly, 
inclined to vote in line with business interests more frequently than many 
Republican appointed Justices who previously sat on the Bench.139 Also, 
research indicates that over 73% of high-profile corporate cases that have 
made national headlines since 2005 were decided in favor of businesses’ 
interests.140 As evidenced by the Roberts Court’s voting records, political 
pressure, as well as pressure from the media and the public’s opinion are 
significant factors that influence the Justices’ decisions. Without 
additional evidence of direct linkage between the Chamber’s filed amicus 
briefs and the Court’s voting pattern in favor of business interests, the 
causal chain between the Chamber’s amicus activity and its influence on 
the Court cannot be affirmatively established.  
CONCLUSION 
While the Chamber has, and continues to position itself as a “friend of 
the Court,” it is possible that the reverse is true - rather, that the Roberts 
Court is a “friend of the Chamber.” The Chamber is an active amicus, 
filing more briefs than most interest groups, and in turn, the Court has 
ruled in favor of the Chamber’s corporate interests. However, there are 
numerous other factors that contribute to the Court’s decision-making 
processes, in addition to its consideration of amicus briefs.   
It is possible that the Roberts Court can be accurately described as a 
“friend of the Chamber,” because the current Justices are likely to 
embrace business-friendly judgments due to of their political affiliation, 
or because of pressure from the media or public opinion. Although amicus 
briefs filed by the Chamber and other pro-business interest groups may 
impact the Court’s decisions, Justices and their clerks admit that amicus 
briefs are often overlooked or disregarded during the voting process.141 In 
light of this revelation, the Chamber’s seeming “success” may in actuality 
be incidental, and not directly causal in nature. 
The relationship between the Court and the Chamber can be likened to 
that of a celebrity or a public figure advocating for social change. While 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. (citing data from Preliminary Data Updating Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, Richard A. 
Posner, “How Business Fairs in the Supreme Court,” 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1431 (2013)).  
 140. Id. 
 141. See Kearney, supra note 5, at 745-46. 
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a celebrity seeks to influence Congress or a similar administrative agency 
to expand healthcare access or peacekeeping efforts, this social push is 
also a means by which the celebrity can increase his or her own publicity. 
It is also unlikely that the celebrity’s social push, independently 
influenced or motivated Congress or an administrative agency to legislate 
or implement change in a certain way.  
Likewise, the Chamber, like a celebrity or public figure seeking to 
influence change, uses its resources and public clout to solicit support for 
its causes. While the Chamber is driven, at least in-part, by its mission 
and purpose142 to promote the needs of business and industry, the 
Chamber, like any interest group, seeks to outwardly appear as an active 
Capitol Hill advocate for it its dues-paying members. Simply because the 
Chamber is an active amicus does not necessarily imply that the Justices 
or their clerks are influenced by or, for that matter, read the Chamber’s 
amicus briefs.  
Legal scholars and spectators obfuscate the correlation and causation 
between the Chamber’s amicus briefs and the Roberts Court’s seeming 
favoritism of corporate interests. The extent to which the Chamber’s 
briefs influence the decisions handed down by the Court cannot be easily 
or objectively measured.143 
Instead, this Comment suggests that empirical studies of the Chamber’s 
influence are inconclusive because they only consider the ultimate 
outcome of the cases for which the NCLC files an amicus brief. Rather, 
the actual influence of the Chamber on the Court must be examined from 
multiple perspectives, including the political pressures from the parties 
appointing the Justices to the Bench, as well as the nation’s social climate 
and citations to the Chamber’s briefs in the Court’s opinions. 
Nevertheless, the findings of this Comment and future empirical research 
will contribute to the jurisprudential understanding of the pro-business 
orientation that has come to characterize the era of the Roberts Court, and 
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us/about-the-us-chamber (last visited Nov. 18, 2017). 
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